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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Appellant Citizen Advocates for Regulation and the
Environment, Inc. (“CARE”) filed a Complaint in the United
States District Court for the District of New Union under the
citizen suit provision of the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (“RCRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992(k), § 6972(a)(2) (2006).
CARE also alleges that the district court had subject-matter
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006) over their claim
under § 553(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5
U.S.C. § 551-559 (2006).
This appeal is from a Final Judgment entered by the
district court on September 29, 2010, dismissing all of CARE‟s
claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. (Order at 9).
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291
(2006).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I. Whether RCRA § 7002(a)(2) provides jurisdiction for
district courts to order the EPA to take action on CARE‟s petition
filed pursuant to RCRA § 7004.
II.Whether 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides jurisdiction for district
courts to order the EPA to take action on CARE‟s petition filed
under 5 U.S.C. § 553(e).
III.Whether the EPA‟s failure to act on CARE‟s petition
constituted a constructive denial of that petition and a
constructive grant of authorization of New Union‟s existing
program, subject to judicial review under RCRA § 7006(b)(2).
IV.Whether this Court should lift the stay in C.A. No. 182010 and proceed with judicial review of EPA‟s constructive
actions.
V.Whether the EPA must withdraw its approval of New
Union‟s program because its resources and performance fail to
meet RCRA‟s state-authorization criteria.
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VI.Whether the EPA must withdraw its approval of New
Union‟s program because the New Union 2000 Environmental
Regulatory Adjustment Act is inconsistent under RCRA.
VII.Whether the EPA must withdraw its approval of New
Union‟s program because the New Union 2000 Environmental
Regulatory Adjustment Act renders the program not equivalent
to the federal program, inconsistent with the federal program, or
in violation of the Commerce Clause.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a final Order of the District Court
for the District of New Union denying CARE‟s motion for
summary judgment.
(Order at 9).
CARE petitioned the
Administrator of the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”) under § 7004 of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6974 (2006),
and § 553(e) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2006), to commence
withdrawal proceedings of New Union‟s hazardous waste
regulatory program operating in lieu of the federal program
under RCRA § 3006(b). (Order at 4). CARE supported the
petition by reporting facts occurring after EPA‟s grant of approval
that changed New Union‟s program and asserted that New
Union‟s program now stood contrary to EPA‟s approval criteria.
Id. The EPA took no action on CARE‟s petition. Id.
CARE instituted an action seeking an injunction under §
7002(a)(2) of RCRA requiring EPA to act on CARE‟s petition. Id.
New Union filed a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 to intervene on
this action, which the district court granted. Id. The parties filed
cross-motions for summary judgment, agreeing that the facts
were uncontested. Id. The district court ultimately denied CARE
relief by granting New Union‟s motion for summary judgment,
finding a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on the
characterization of EPA‟s approval or disproval as an order rather
than a rule. (Order at 7-9).
Simultaneous to the filing of CARE‟s district court action,
CARE filed a petition for judicial review under RCRA § 7006(b)(2)
in this Court. (Order at 4-5). Specifically, CARE sought review of

3

05

4/24/2011 2:30 AM

Appellant

2011]

BEST BRIEF: APPELLANTS

129

the EPA‟s constructive grant of approval of New Union‟s existing
hazardous waste regulatory program. (Order at 5). New Union
filed a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 to intervene in this action
as well, which this Court granted. Id. EPA moved to stay this
proceeding pending the outcome of the action in district court. Id.
The Court granted this unopposed motion and stayed the action.
Id. CARE presently seeks to lift the stay and proceed with
judicial review. (Order at 1).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
RCRA provides a comprehensive federal program for
hazardous waste disposal that permits states to administer their
own program as long as the state meets RCRA authorization
standards. See 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (2006). In 1986, New Union
sought and was granted authorization under RCRA § 3006 to
administer its own program through its Department of
Environmental Protection (“DEP”), as the state met all statutory
and regulatory requirements issued by Congress and the EPA,
respectively. (Order at 5). In order to meet these requirements,
New Union assured the EPA that the state had adequate
resources to administer and enforce the program by issuing
timely permits, inspecting RCRA-regulated facilities biannually,
and sufficiently punishing all significant violations. (Order at
10). Among these assurances, New Union noted it had at least
fifty full-time employees to monitor 1,200
RCRA-permitted
hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities
(“TSDs”). Id.
In the last decade amidst a financial crisis, New Union has
depleted its RCRA program resources while continuously issuing
permits to more than 300 additional TSDs, even though
approximately 900 of the state‟s facilities currently operate with
expired permits.
(Order at 10-11).
Although increasing
permitted facilities, the state has reduced program personnel to
thirty full-time employees from the fifty employed when the
program was approved. (Order at 10). Further, the state‟s
assurances that it would inspect all facilities at least every other
year has resulted in the state inspecting only 10% of the facilities
annually with the EPA inspecting an additional 10%. (Order at
11). Finally, New Union prosecuted only six of the twenty-two
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significant permit violations in 2009, and the EPA did the same.
Id.
In 2000, New Union passed the 2000 Environmental
Regulatory Adjustment Act (“ERAA”), which significantly
amended two pieces of legislation with important environmental
consequences. Id. First, the ERAA amended the Railroad
Regulation Act (“RRA”) by removing all environmental
responsibilities concerning intrastate railroad facilities from the
state‟s RCRA program and vesting that authority in the
independently
run
New
Union
Railroad
Commission
(“Commission”). (Order at 12). The amendment removed all
permitting, inspection, and enforcement authority previously held
by the DEP and eliminated all criminal sanctions for violations of
environmental statutes. Id. Second, the ERAA amended the
state‟s RCRA program by effectively prohibiting the treatment,
storage, or transportation of Pollutant X within the state. Id.
The amendment proscribes any current TSD from treating
Pollutant X, prohibits the DEP from issuing permits for new
facilities that would treat Pollutant X, and restricts the
transportation of Pollutant X through the state. Id. Instead, all
Pollutant X is to be sent out of state. Id.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appellate courts use the de novo standard when reviewing
a district court‟s denial of summary judgment. PCI Transp. Inc.
v. Fort Worth & W. R.R. Co., 418 F.3d 535, 540 (5th Cir. 2005).
Summary judgment is only appropriate if “there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). Therefore,
this Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide whether CARE was
entitled to jurisdiction under RCRA and 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and
whether the EPA should be ordered to withdraw its approval of
New Union‟s hazardous waste regulatory program.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The district court erred in holding that RCRA § 7002(a)(2)
does not provide district courts with jurisdiction to order EPA to
act on CARE‟s properly filed petition under RCRA
§ 7004.
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CARE correctly submitted their petition under RCRA § 7004
since EPA‟s grant of approval of New Union‟s hazardous waste
program was a rule and not an order. In addition to the grant of
approval meeting the conditions of a rule under 5 U.S.C. § 551(4)
(2006), EPA is entitled to Chevron deference on its interpretation
of RCRA § 7004 that such a grant of approval constitutes a rule.
Since the Administrator failed to perform a mandatory duty
required by RCRA § 7004, RCRA § 7002(a)(2) grants jurisdiction
to district courts to hear this citizen suit filed against EPA.
Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and the
district court erred by holding to the contrary. CARE properly
filed their petition under 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) seeking withdrawal of
EPA‟s authorization of New Union‟s hazardous waste program.
EPA‟s grant of authorization to New Union‟s program is a rule
under 5 U.S.C. § 551(4), and as such, CARE must be given the
right to petition for the repeal of that rule under 5 U.S.C. §
553(e). The APA is a federal law, CARE is seeking repeal of an
agency rule under that law, and therefore 28 U.S.C. § 1331
provides jurisdiction in the district courts.
Judicial review is also available in this Court under 42
U.S.C. § 6976(b)(2) (2006) for the Administrator‟s grant of
authorization of New Union‟s existing program. The EPA‟s
failure to act within a reasonable time on CARE‟s petition was
tantamount to a denial of the petition. This denial had the effect
of a grant of authorization of New Union‟s existing hazardous
waste program. The plain language of RCRA § 7006(b)(2)
specifically grants jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals to review
this authorization.
This congressional intent, along with
traditional notions of judicial economy, favors lifting the stay of
the proceedings currently before this Court and proceeding with
judicial review of EPA‟s improper grant of authorization of New
Union‟s program as it existed at the time of the petition.
Examining New Union‟s program, it is clear that the EPA
must withdraw its approval. The program — particularly the
permitting, inspection, and enforcement aspects — falls well
below established RCRA minimum standards. Congress used
mandatory language to explicitly state that when a program falls
below these minimum standards the EPA must withdraw its
authorization. Further, New Union‟s attempts to amend its
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environmental statutes are inconsistent under the Hazardous
Material Transportation Act and are preempted by that statute.
Removing rail hazardous waste facilities and restricting the
transportation of Pollutant X violates a list of federal regulations
promulgated by the EPA. Finally, New Union‟s proscription of
most Pollutant X transportation and all Pollutant X treatment,
storage, and disposal prohibits the free flow of interstate
commerce and therefore violates the Commerce Clause.
ARGUMENT
I.

RCRA § 7002(A)(2) PROVIDED JURISDICTION
WITHIN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF NEW UNION TO ORDER THE
ADMINISTRATOR TO TAKE ACTION PURSUANT
TO CARE’S PROPERLY FILED PETITION UNDER
RCRA § 7004.

CARE properly filed a petition under RCRA § 7004, which
clearly states that “any person may petition the Administrator for
the . . . repeal of any regulation under this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. §
6974(a) (2006). CARE correctly petitioned the Administrator to
repeal the rule permitting New Union to operate the state
hazardous waste program in violation of the state‟s permit.
Under RCRA § 7004(a), the Administrator has a mandatory duty
to act on the petition. Id. Since the Administrator failed to
perform a nondiscretionary duty, RCRA § 7002(a)(2) clearly
allowed CARE to bring its citizen suit “in the district court for the
district in which
the . . . violation occurred.” 42 U.S.C. §
6972(a)(2) (2006). Since the violation occurred in New Union,
jurisdiction was proper in the District Court of New Union.
A. CARE’s petition was correctly submitted under
RCRA § 7004 since the EPA’s approval of New
Union’s hazardous waste program was a rule and
not an order.
RCRA § 7004(a) clearly states that “[a]ny person may
petition the Administrator for the . . . repeal of any regulation
under this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 6974(a). CARE petitioned the
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EPA to repeal the rule/regulation permitting New Union to
operate the state hazardous waste program outside of its permit.
When statutory language is unambiguous, it should be
interpreted by its ordinary and common meaning. Holster v.
Gatco, Inc., 130 S.Ct. 1575, 1577 (2010). The ordinary meaning of
regulation is “a rule or order, having legal force, usually issued by
an administrative agency.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1398 (9th ed.
2009) (emphasis added).
Since RCRA provides no definition for what constitutes a
rule or an order, the EPA must look to the APA, the controlling
act for all agencies, for the definition of a rule. Under the APA, a
rule is “the whole or part of an agency statement of general or
particular applicability and future effect designed to implement,
interpret or prescribe law or policy . . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 551(4). In
Iacaboni v. United States, the district court held that the
definition of a rule does not require the agency‟s statement to be
“formally designated as a rule or regulation to fall within the
APA framework.” 251 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1039 (D. Mass. 2003).
Therefore, the EPA does not have to formally assert that its
statement is a rule for the statement to be covered by the APA
rule framework.
1. The EPA’s inaction on New Union’s program
constitutes an agency statement.
The EPA stated its approval for the program through
silence. The Administrator has a mandatory duty to respond in
writing to CARE‟s petition, among other actions, but the
Administrator did not. 40 C.F.R. § 271.23(b)(1) (2010). The
Administrator‟s inaction for almost one year is a statement from
the EPA that is “tantamount to approval of [New Union‟s]
decision[].” Scott v. City of Hammond, 741 F.2d 992, 998 (7th Cir.
1984). Here, New Union violated its EPA approved state
hazardous waste program. The EPA‟s silence and inaction was
the agency‟s statement approving New Union‟s program.
In Balsam v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services, the court determined that a moratorium on receiving
certificate-of-need applications was not a rule. 452 So. 2d 976 (Fl.
Dist. Ct. App. 1984). In its analysis, the court explained that an
agency statement is a rule if it creates particular rights and
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adversely affects others. Id. at 977-78. The EPA‟s statement
accepting New Union‟s permit violations created a right for New
Union and other similarly situated states to ignore and actively
violate their permits.
Additionally, the EPA‟s statement
adversely affected others since it allowed for the increase in the
number of hazardous TSDs while decreasing the number of
employees dedicated to the program. (Order at 10). New Union‟s
program not only violates EPA‟s grant of authorization for the
program, but it also stands repugnant to the objectives of RCRA.
In particular, EPA‟s statement allows for “hazardous waste
management practices . . . which [do not] protect[] human health
and the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(4) (2006). Clearly, the
EPA‟s statement adversely affects others and is therefore a rule.
2. Even if this Court rejects the Balsam court’s
definition of a rule, the EPA’s statement is still
a rule under the definition provided by § 551(4)
of the APA.
In order for the EPA‟s statement to be a rule, the statement
must be of “general or particular applicability and future effect
designed to implement, interpret or prescribe law or policy . . . .”
5 U.S.C. § 551(4). The EPA‟s statement applies generally to all
approved state programs because the statement asserts that EPA
inaction on a petition is tantamount to a grant of authorization
for programs that fall below approval requirements. However,
the APA‟s definition of rule also allows for particular
applicability. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4). It is well established that where
there is a specific rule, such a rule governs over the general.
Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 524 (1989).
Regardless of whether the EPA‟s statement applies generally to
all states or specifically to New Union, it still meets the
requirements for a rule.
The EPA‟s statement also has future effect on the law or
policy of state permit programs. By allowing New Union to
continue violating its EPA-approved state program, the EPA is
stating a new rule that it will allow such violations to persist in
the future. Conduct that the agency intends to follow in the
future clearly has a future effect on the law or policy of state
permit programs. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. EPA, 669 F. Supp. 536,
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539 (D. Ct. D.C. 1987). In addition to the future effect on law or
policy, the EPA‟s statement approves future practices of not only
New Union‟s program, but also of any state program that has
undergone changes inconsistent with the approval requirements.
The district court erred in holding that the EPA‟s approval
of New Union‟s program was an order. Orders are retroactive in
applicability. PBW Stock Exch. v. SEC, 485 F.2d 718, 732 (3d Cir.
1973). Since the New Union legislature recently passed new laws
concerning the program, the implications of EPA‟s grant of
authorization affect facts and situations yet to occur. The EPA‟s
approval of New Union‟s hazardous waste program is a rule
under the definition provided by the APA in § 551(4).
B. The EPA’s determination that its approval of New
Union’s hazardous waste program was a rule is
entitled to Chevron deference.
Having established that EPA‟s inaction, or constructive
action, is a rule under the APA, “the choice [to] proceed[] by
general rule . . . is one that lies primarily in the informed
discretion of the administrative agency.” British Caledonian
Airways, Ltd. v. C.A.B., 584 F.2d 982, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (citing
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947)). Since this
choice is one within the agency‟s discretion, the EPA‟s
determination that its approval of New Union‟s program is a rule
is entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.
Def. Counsel, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Contrary to the district court‟s holding, the EPA is not
interpreting the definition of a rule under the APA by stating
that its approval of New Union‟s program is a rule. (Order at 6).
The EPA is interpreting RCRA § 7004(a), a statute clearly
administered by the EPA. The EPA is interpreting § 7004(a) to
declare that the EPA‟s approval of New Union‟s program
constitutes a rule, and this rule can be promulgated, amended, or
repealed by the Administrator. This interpretation by EPA is
clearly allowed Chevron deference.
Chevron employs a two-step process to determine whether
an agency‟s interpretation of a statute is valid. The first step is to
determine whether the statutory language is ambiguous. Nat’l
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Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n. v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S.
967, 986 (2005). If the language is unambiguous, then the Court
simply applies the plain meaning of the statute regardless of the
agency‟s interpretation. Id. However, if the statutory language is
ambiguous, as is the term rule in § 7004(a), the Court must
determine if the agency‟s interpretation is reasonable. Id. If the
agency‟s interpretation is reasonable, the Court must accept that
interpretation despite the court‟s interpretation differing from the
agency‟s interpretation. Id.
Since it has been established that the rule referenced in §
7004(a) is ambiguous, this Court should move to step two and
hold that EPA‟s interpretation was reasonable. The record is
devoid of any evidence showing why EPA‟s approval of New
Union‟s program was considered a rule by the agency. However,
as long at the agency can adequately explain why it interpreted
its approval to be a rule, the Court must apply Chevron deference.
Nat’l Cable, 545 U.S. 967 at 981. This high level of deference is
appropriate because the purpose of Chevron is to leave the
interpretation of statutory ambiguities to the expertise of the
implementing agency. Id.
The district court erred in holding that the EPA interpreted
the APA‟s definition of rule under 5 U.S.C. § 551(4). The EPA
rightly interpreted a statute under its authority - RCRA
§
7004(a). Since the EPA interpreted RCRA, the agency is entitled
to great deference under Chevron, and the Court should uphold
the EPA‟s decision that its approval of New Union‟s program was
a rule.
C. RCRA § 7002(a)(2) grants jurisdiction for district
courts to hear citizen suits filed against the EPA
because the Administrator failed to perform the
mandatory duty required by RCRA § 7004.
The Administrator failed to perform her mandatory duty to
act on CARE‟s petition as required by RCRA § 7004, which states
the Administrator, “within a reasonable time . . . shall take
action.” 42 U.S.C. § 6974(a) (emphasis added). The wellestablished statutory interpretation cannon of noscitur a sociis
states that a word “gathers meaning from the words around it.”
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Oregon, 515
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U.S. 687, 702 (1995). Within the same section of RCRA the word
may is used; if Congress wanted to use the word may, a
discretionary term, it would have done so. See 42 U.S.C. §
6974(a) (“Any person may petition the Administrator . . .”)
(emphasis added); Neuwirth v. La. State Bd. of Dentistry, 845
F.2d 553, 557 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that using “may” in place of
“shall” affords discretion on the agency enforcing the statute).
When “may” and “shall” are used within the same statutory
section, the ordinary meaning of the words is applied so that the
former is permissive and the latter mandatory. Ctr. for Biological
Diversity v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 450 F.3d 930, 935 (9th Cir.
2006) (quoting Haynes v. United States, 891 F.2d 235, 239-40 (9th
Cir. 1989). Congress specifically chose to use shall to describe the
Administrator‟s duty to act on the petition. While the district
court asserted that shall does not necessarily require mandatory
action, this assertion is easily refuted. (Order at 6). The
Supreme Court has stated that Congress‟s use of the mandatory
word “shall” imposes a nondiscretionary obligation. Nat’l Ass’n of
Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 661 (2007)
(citing Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001)).
1. The Administrator failed to perform her
mandatory duty to act on CARE’s petition.
The Administrator had a mandatory duty to act on the
petition filed by CARE. The language used throughout § 7002
and § 7004 includes both may and shall. It is therefore
understood that the Legislature could have made the
Administrator‟s action on a petition discretionary by simply using
the word may in place of shall. However, the legislature
specifically chose shall to indicate the mandatory duty required
by the Administrator to act on the petition.
Although the EPA may assert that they are within the
reasonable time requirement to respond to the petition in RCRA §
7004(a), the year between the date the petition was submitted
and the date that CARE filed an action in the district court is
unreasonable due to the horrific and blatant violations of New
Union‟s program.
A one-year abstention from statutorily
mandated action is an acceptance of New Union‟s program as it
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exists today despite the litany of violations the state is
committing.
2. The district court had jurisdiction under RCRA
§ 7002(a)(2) to hear CARE’s citizen suit against
the EPA.
RCRA § 7002(a) states that “[t]he district court shall have
jurisdiction . . . to order the Administrator to perform the act or
duty . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (2006). The EPA or New Union
may assert that for citizen suits brought under § 7002(a)(2) the
actions “may be brought in the district court in which the alleged
violation occurred or in the District Court of the District of
Columbia.” Id. The permissive may language is used as opposed
to shall so that the party bringing the action can have a choice of
forums. However, both choices are district courts, and therefore
the actions are to be brought before federal courts.
II. JURISDICTION WAS PROPER UNDER 28 U.S.C. §
1331 IN THE DISTRICT COURT TO ORDER THE
EPA TO ACT ON CARE’S PROPERLY FILED
PETITION UNDER 5 U.S.C. § 553(E) TO
WITHDRAW EPA’S AUTHORIZATION OF NEW
UNION’S HAZARDOUS WASTE PROGRAM.
Pursuant to § 553(e) of the APA, every agency, including
the EPA, must give an interested party the right to bring a
petition for the repeal of a rule. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (emphasis
added). CARE properly submitted their petition under 5 U.S.C. §
553(e) since the EPA‟s inaction toward New Union‟s state
hazardous waste program was a rule, as discussed above, under 5
U.S.C. § 551(4). Because the jurisdictional question arises under
the APA, a federal law, jurisdiction is proper in the district court
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
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A. Since the EPA’s approval of New Union’s program
was a rule under 5 U.S.C. § 551(4), CARE must be
given the right to petition for the repeal of that rule
under 5 U.S.C. § 553(e).
Section 553(e) of the APA states that “[e]ach agency shall
give an interested person the right to petition for the . . . repeal of
a rule. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (emphasis added). As noted above,
EPA‟s inaction on CARE‟s petition was a rule under the APA, and
therefore CARE‟s petition to repeal that rule is proper under §
553(e). As with RCRA, the APA uses both shall and may within
its text. While may is not used in another subsection within §
553, may is used several times in addition to shall in § 552
concerning public information. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006). The same
analysis of shall used above pertains to the word‟s use in § 553(e).
National Ass’n of Home Builders states that shall requires a
mandatory nondiscretionary obligation. 551 U.S. at 661. CARE
has clearly met all the requirements under § 553(e), and therefore
its petition was properly filed under § 553(e).
B. Because 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) is a federal law, the district
court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to hear
CARE’s properly filed petition for the repeal of an
agency rule.
The APA does not grant jurisdiction itself, but when
combined with 28 U.S.C. § 1331, jurisdiction is sufficient “. . . over
a challenge to federal agency action.” Huang v. Mukasey, No.
C07-132RAJ, 2008 WL 418048, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 12, 2008).
Since the EPA, a federal agency, has violated a mandatory
provision of the APA, federal courts have jurisdiction. Reiner v.
W. Village Assocs., 768 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 1985), see Califano v.
Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977). As Saini v. U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services held, “. . . the APA vests the Court with
jurisdiction to „compel agency action unlawfully withheld or
unreasonably delayed.‟” 553 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1175 (E.D. Cal.
2008) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(1)). The district court erred in
granting New Union‟s motion for summary judgment. CARE is
clearly allowed to petition the EPA for repeal of an agency rule
under 5 U.S.C. § 553(e).
CARE‟s petition rightly found
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jurisdiction before the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 since
5 U.S.C. § 553(e), a federal law, demands that the EPA give
CARE the right to petition.
III. THE EPA'S FAILURE TO ACT WITHIN A
REASONABLE TIME ON CARE'S PETITION WAS
EQUIVALENT TO A DENIAL OF THE PETITION
AND ULTIMATELY A GRANT OF
AUTHORIZATION OF NEW UNION'S EXISTING
PROGRAM, THE LATTER OF WHICH IS
REVIEWABLE UNDER RCRA § 7006(B).
CARE's petition to withdraw authorization of New Union's
existing program under RCRA § 7004 created a duty for EPA to
take action on the petition “within a reasonable time following
receipt of such petition.” 42. U.S.C. § 6974(a). The APA defines
“agency action” as “the whole or a part of an agency rule, order,
license, sanction, relief or the equivalent or denial thereof, or
failure to act.” 5. U.S.C. § 551(13) (2006) (emphasis added). The
EPA's inaction in this instance squarely fits the APA's definition
of “agency action” and should be treated as such.
A. The EPA’s failure to act on CARE’s petition should
be classified as a denial of the petition.
In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, the D.C.
Circuit examined circumstances under which there may be a
judicial remedy for the failure of an administrative agency to act
promptly. 428 F.2d 1093, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The court
reviewed the failure of the Secretary of the Department of
Agriculture to take action with respect to a petition seeking
cancellation of registration for the pesticide DDT. Id. at 1096.
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act required
that pesticides shipped in interstate commerce bear labels that
included warnings necessary to prevent injury to people. Id. at
1095. The Secretary was to refuse or cancel the registration of
pesticides failing to comply with this requirement. Id. The
Environmental Defense Fund filed a petition with the Secretary
requesting that notices of cancellation be issued for all poisons
containing DDT and the suspension of registration for all such
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products pending outcome of the proceedings. Id. at 1096. The
Secretary issued notices of cancellation for four uses of DDT but
took no action on the request for interim suspension. Id. The
Secretary contended that partial compliance on the petition
rendered the petitioners claim unripe because the Secretary had
neither granted nor denied the requested relief. Id. at 1098. The
court held that, “when administrative inaction has precisely the
same impact on the rights of the parties as denial of relief, an
agency cannot preclude judicial review by casting its decision in
the form of inaction rather than in the form of an order denying
relief.” Id. The Secretary's inaction with regard to the request
for interim suspension of the registration of DDT was tantamount
to an order denying suspension. Id.
It is uncontested that the EPA took no action on CARE's
petition to commence withdrawal proceedings. However, the
Administrator must respond in writing to petitions. 40 CFR §
271.23(b)(1) (2010). The Administrator has taken no action since
CARE submitted its petition, issuing a de facto denial of CARE's
petition. The EPA did not commence withdrawal proceedings,
and New Union's existing program continues to operate in lieu of
federal regulations.
B. The EPA's denial of CARE's petition was
tantamount to a grant of authorization of New
Union's existing program, making it subject to
judicial review.
In U.S. Brewers Association, Inc. v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit
found that the EPA Administrator's refusal to repeal his
regulation was, for jurisdictional purposes, not only equivalent to
its promulgation but also reviewable because of this equivalency.
600 F.2d 974, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (emphasis added). The
Brewers Association petitioned the EPA pursuant to § 7004 of
RCRA, requesting repeal of guidelines issued for beverage
containers.
Id.
The denial of the petition to repeal the
regulations was held to be equivalent to a promulgation of the
regulations, rendering that action subject to judicial review. Id.
The Court of International Trade echoed this sentiment in
Associacao Dos Industriais de Cordoaria e Redes v. U.S., where a
group of importers brought an action against the Department of
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Commerce and the International Trade Commission, among
others, seeking mandamus against the agencies ordering them to
terminate antidumping investigations and enjoining them from
filing antidumping petitions for one year. 828 F. Supp. 978, 981
(Ct. Int‟l Trade 1993). The Department of Commerce argued that
the importers did not have standing because the agency had not
issued a final decision and therefore had not acted. Id. The court
held that, specifically when administrative inaction has the same
impact on the parties as a denial of relief, agency inaction may be
tantamount to a final action. Id. The court further stated, “[the
Department of] Commerce's position precludes review in
circumstances where review would be most needed, in the face of
administrative recalcitrance.” Id.
Similarly, the EPA should not be allowed to evade judicial
review by simply ignoring petitions. The EPA was not deciding
whether or not to take action. The agency has taken no action at
all. As a result, citizens of New Union are subjected to the EPA's
tacit approval of New Union's existing program, which is
inconsistent with and not equivalent to federal regulations under
RCRA. This is a situation where judicial review is most needed,
as the EPA‟s apparent intention is to continue approving this
steadily declining state program. In failing to take action on
CARE's petition, and effectively denying it, the EPA has
constructively granted authorization of New Union's existing
state program.
C. The presumption of unreviewability of agency
inaction does not apply.
There is tension between the classification of agency
inaction as action for purposes of review and the presumption of
unreviewability of agency inaction articulated by the Supreme
Court in Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985). In Chaney,
prison inmates sentenced to death by lethal injection petitioned
the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) for enforcement of the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, arguing that the drugs to
be used in their execution were not approved for such use, and
therefore violated the Act. Id. at 823-24. In response to the
FDA‟s denial of their petition, the inmates brought a claim under
§ 701(a)(2) of the APA in federal court seeking enforcement
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actions on the claim. Id. The Court found that it lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction to review the claim because an agency's
decision not to take enforcement action is presumed immune from
judicial review. Id. at 832. The Court stated that unreviewable
agency inaction isn't suited for review where the statute in
question was deemed absolutely committed to the agency's
judgment. Id. at 831. Justice Rehnquist reasoned that an abuse
of discretion analysis would prove futile without judicially
manageable standards against which a court could judge an
agency‟s exercise of discretion. Id at 832. Where Congress
provides guidelines for an agency to follow, particularly in its
exercise of enforcement powers within the substantive statute,
agencies are not free to disregard legislative direction in the
statutory scheme that they administer. Id. at 832-33. Available
guidelines, or “law to apply,” is evidence of Congressional intent
to circumscribe traditional agency enforcement discretion and
should be treated as such. Id. at 834-35.
Justice Marshall, concurring in Chaney, stated that the
“'presumption of unreviewability' [was] fundamentally at odds
with rule-of-law principles firmly embedded in our
jurisprudence,” and hoped that this presumption would be limited
to the facts of that case. Id. at 840. Justice Marshall stated,
“discretion can be a veil for laziness, corruption, incompetence,
lack of will, or other motives, and for that reason the presence of
discretion should not bar a court from considering a claim of . . .
arbitrary use of discretion.”
Id. at 847 (internal citations
omitted).
A large, firmly entrenched body of lower-court
jurisprudence refutes the majority's reliance on the “tradition” of
unreviewability suggested in Chaney. Id. at 850. Additionally,
these cases recognize that:
attempting to draw a line for the purposes of judicial review
between affirmative exercises of coercive agency power and
negative agency refusals to act is simply untenable; one of the
very purposes fueling the birth of administrative agencies was
the reality that governmental refusal to act could have just as
devastating an effect upon life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness as coercive governmental action.
As Justice
Frankfurter . . . wrote for this Court, “any distinction, as such,
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between 'negative' and 'affirmative' orders, as a touchstone of
jurisdiction to review [agency action] serves no useful purpose.”

Id. at 850-51 (quoting Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States,
307 U.S. 125, 143 (1939)).
The EPA's regulations provide guidelines that the agency
must follow in determining whether there is sufficient cause to
initiate withdrawal proceedings under RCRA. These guidelines
are set forth in 40 C.F.R. §§ 271.4 (consistency), 271.9-14
(equivalency of state program), and 271.22 (criteria for
withdrawal of State programs) (2010). The focus need not be
centered on the inaction by the EPA, but rather on the effects of
that inaction as well as the congressional intent for the agency to
exercise its enforcement power under RCRA. The EPA's inaction
was agency action having the effect of granting authorization to
New Union's existing program, review of which is proper under
42 U.S.C. § 6976(b)(2).
IV. BECAUSE JURISDICTION IS PROPER UNDER 42
U.S.C. § 6976(B)(2), THE COURT OF APPEALS
SHOULD LIFT THE STAY AND PROCEED WITH
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF EPA'S CONSTRUCTIVE
GRANT OF AUTHORIZATION.
The United States Courts of Appeals are inferior courts,
created by Congress's Article III powers, and only have the
jurisdiction that Congress confers upon them by statute. 15 C.
Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §
3901 (1976). The statutory basis for this Court's direct review of
the EPA's action in this case can be found in 42 U.S.C. §
6976(b)(2).
RCRA § 7006(b) provides for “review of the Administrator's
action . . . in granting, denying, or withdrawing authorization . . .
under section 6926 of this title . . . in the Circuit Court of Appeals
of the United States for the Federal judicial district in which such
person resides . . . upon application by such person.” 42 U.S.C. §
6976(b)(2). Congress explicitly vested the Court of Appeals with
subject-matter jurisdiction over these claims. Although review in
the District Court is proper under 42 U.S.C. § 6976 for the EPA's
failure to take action on CARE's petition, that failure had the
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effect of a grant of authorization of New Union's program, and is
reviewable in this Court. Public policy favors lifting the stay in
the action currently before this Court and proceeding with
judicial review of the EPA's constructive grant of authorization.
A. Congressional intent favors review of the
Administrator's grant of authorization of a State
program in the Court of Appeals.
The plain language of § 6976(b)(2) explicitly provides for
appellate review of the Administrator's grant of authorization
under 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) in the Court of Appeals. 42 U.S.C. §
6976(b) (2006). Section 6976(b) concludes, “such review shall be
in accordance with sections 701 through 706 of Title 5 of the
APA.” Id.
Looking to the APA for additional support and clarification,
§ 701(b)(2) references
§ 551(13) of the Act for the definition
of specific terms. 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(2) (2006). As previously
addressed, “agency action” is defined in this section as inclusive
of failure to act.
5 U.S.C. § 551(13). Therefore under the APA,
it is fair to read the Court of Appeals‟s grant of jurisdiction under
section 6976(b)(2) as, “review of the Administrator's failure to act
in granting, denying, or withdrawing authorization . . . under
section 6926 of this title.”
The APA's support of CARE's position does not end with §
701. Section 703 sets out the form and venue for judicial review.
5 U.S.C. § 703 (2006). In pertinent part, § 703 states, “the form of
proceeding for judicial review is the special statutory review
proceeding relevant to the subject matter in a court specified by
statute.” Id. Additionally, § 704, describing the types of
reviewable actions, states that “[a]gency action made reviewable
by statute and final agency action for which there is no other
adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.”
5
U.S.C. § 704 (2006) (emphasis added). These relevant sections of
the APA again direct the court to the grant of subject-matter
jurisdiction contained in § 6976(b)(2). Full effect must be given to
the clear congressional intent to grant jurisdiction over these
types of actions to the Courts of Appeals. To hold otherwise
would render this section of RCRA meaningless.
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B. Judicial economy also favors review of the
Administrator's grant of authorization of a state
program in the Court of Appeals.
A careful consideration of the effect of the other alternative
before the Court, remanding to the District Court, provides
further support for lifting the stay and proceeding in this Court.
The injunctive relief offered by the district court ordering the
EPA to act on CARE's petition, i.e., exhaustion of administrative
remedies, is an inadequate means of relief. Requiring the
exhaustion of administrative remedies articulated by the
Supreme Court in Woodford v. Ngo unnecessarily complicates
this judicial review. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006).
Assuming this action is remanded to the district court, and
the EPA is required to take action on CARE's petition, the result
would require the EPA to formalize a determination it already
made — denial of the petition. This creates a redundancy in the
judicial review, weighing heavily against established public policy
favoring judicial economy. By not acting, the EPA made its
determination and granted authorization of New Union's
program as it existed.
Requiring the EPA to make this
determination formal explicitly adds an unnecessary step in the
judicial review of the EPA's grant of authorization. After the
district court required the EPA to formalize its decision, this
Court would be the eventual audience of CARE's cause of action
for review. CARE would be asking this Court to review the EPA's
arbitrary and capricious grant of authorization of New Union's
program at the time of CARE's petition.
Meanwhile, the
continuing approval of New Union's program would result in
irreparable harm disproportionate to the public benefit from
requiring that there be strict compliance with this procedure.
Model State Administrative Procedure Act (1981) § 5-103
(providing an exception to the requirement that there be
exhaustion of administrative remedy prior to review).
It makes little sense to remand to the district court,
considering Congress intended to give this Court the authority to
review actions by the Administrator in granting, denying, or
withdrawing state authorization. If, in enacting RCRA, Congress
intended that as a matter of national policy, hazardous wastes
were to be comprehensively regulated, it strains credulity to
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assert that Congress meant for the EPA to stand passively aside
while New Union flagrantly violates its statutory mandates.
Absent compliance with the regulatory framework, hazardous
waste will continue to be disposed of in manners that result in
significant, and sometimes irreversible, damage to the
environment. Both the congressional intent of RCRA and judicial
economy heavily favor that the Court lift the stay and review the
EPA's grant of authorization of New Union's program.
V. NEW UNION’S RESOURCES AND
PERFORMANCE DO NOT MEET STATEAUTHORIZATION STANDARDS; THEREFORE,
EPA MUST WITHDRAW APPROVAL BECAUSE
CONGRESS EXPLICITLY LIMITED THE
AGENCY’S DISCRETION AND CHANEY’S
PRESUMPTION DOES NOT APPLY.
Although the critical issue before the Court is the EPA‟s
mandatory duty to withdraw authorization, there must be a
threshold showing of New Union‟s inability to meet RCRA
authorization criteria. To maintain state authorization, RCRA
requires three conditions be met. First, the state program must
be equivalent to the federal program. 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b). In
other words, a state program must at least meet the minimum
standards the federal program establishes.
4 William H.
Rodgers, Jr., Rodger’s Envtl. L. § 7:22 (2010). Second, a state‟s
program must be consistent with the federal or state programs in
other states. 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b). Third, the state‟s program
must provide adequate enforcement to comply with these
requirements. Id. Parts VI and VII look at New Union‟s failure
to comply with the consistency requirement. This Part addresses
the program‟s failure to satisfy the equivalency and enforcement
standards established in RCRA § 3006(b), and why this failure
mandates withdrawal.
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A. New Union’s hazardous waste program has fallen
well below the equivalency and enforcement
standards necessary for state authorization.
The EPA established the basic minimum requirements for the
federal program throughout Part 271 of the Code of Federal
Regulations entitled “Requirements for Authorization of State
Hazardous Waste Programs.”
According to the documents
provided by New Union to the EPA, the state has failed to
implement even the basic requirements necessary to meet these
minimum standards. The DEP‟s 2009 Annual Report shows that
currently at least 60% of New Union‟s 1500 TSDs operate with an
expired permit. (Order at 11). New Union further concedes that
under the state‟s policy of granting approximately 50 of its 125
annual permits to new or permitted facilities seeking expansion,
only 75 permits are left to address the 900 facilities operating
without a current permit. Id. Thinking optimistically, and
assuming the 900 figure remains static, it would take New Union
at least 12 years to bring its permitting program into federal
RCRA compliance. Of course, the Governor‟s likely termination
of up to 10% of the DEP‟s current employees administering the
program tempers this optimism. (Order at 10-11). In light of
this, it seems almost unnecessary to point out that § 271.13
requires New Union to prohibit operation of TSDs without a
permit. 40 C.F.R. § 271.13 (2010). New Union‟s permitting
program did not meet the minimum standards at the time of
CARE‟s petition, and it is unlikely that it will do so in the near
future.
Unfortunately, New Union‟s inspection and investigation
resources fall even shorter of the federal minimum standard than
the state‟s permitting program.
The EPA‟s regulations
unequivocally require a state to have adequate inspection and
investigation resources to monitor the state program. 40 C.F.R. §
271.15(a), (b) (2010). In this light, the EPA approved New
Union‟s hazardous waste program nearly 25 years ago with the
assurance that New Union had the resources to “inspect[] RCRA
regulated facilities at least every other year.” (Order at 11)
(emphasis added). Instead of inspecting all facilities every other
year, New Union currently has only enough resources to inspect
20% of the facilities in this timeframe. Id. Even after soliciting
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the EPA‟s assistance, the state can inspect 40% at most. Id.
Worse yet, the decrease in DEP inspectors from 15 to seven since
1986 is likely to worsen because of personnel cuts to programs in
which federal employees can perform state employees‟ functions.
(Order at 10).
Finally, DEP‟s proven inability to prosecute even one-third
of the significant permit violations — much less the hundreds of
“minor” violations — demonstrates New Union‟s complete
inability to implement the enforcement standards necessary to
ensure compliance. (Order at 11). Once again, the EPA‟s
regulations leave no doubt as to the state‟s expected enforcement
authority. A state must have remedies available to “restrain
immediately and effectively” all facilities not in compliance with
their permits or endangering the public and environment. 40
C.F.R. § 271.16 (2010). Clearly, the 12 enforcement actions taken
last year by the state and the EPA fall noticeably short of
restraining the 900 facilities that are subject to this regulation.
(Order at 11).
B. The plain language of Section 3006(e) requires that
the EPA withdraw authorization of New Union’s
hazardous waste program.
While New Union‟s deficiencies are clear, this Court must
address the more difficult question of whether RCRA requires the
EPA‟s withdrawal of state authorization. Though the EPA
contends RCRA gives the agency considerable discretion
concerning withdrawal decisions, this Court must first look to see
“whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. After examining the statute
and case law, it is clear that Congress indeed addressed this
issue, and that the EPA misconstrued its discretion to determine
whether state authorization is satisfied with its duty to withdraw
authorization once a determination is made that the state does
not meet this criteria. Because Congress gave the EPA no
discretion concerning withdrawal decisions after a deficiency
determination is made, the EPA must begin withdrawal
proceedings against New Union under § 3006(e) of RCRA.
“The starting point for [the] interpretation of a statute is
always its language.” Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,
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490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989). Concerning withdrawal, RCRA states
that after the EPA determines a state program is not meeting
authorization standards, the Administrator shall notify the state
and give them opportunity to correct the deficiencies.
42
U.S.C. § 6926(e) (2010) (emphasis added). If no corrective action
is taken, “the Administrator shall withdraw authorization of such
program and establish a Federal
program . . . .” Id.
(emphasis added). The statute uses conditional language to mark
where the EPA‟s discretion ends and statutory duties begin.
Subsection (e)‟s first clause implicitly recognizes the EPA‟s
discretion to determine whether a state has properly
administered and enforced an authorized program. Id. The
language, “[w]henever the Administrator
determines . . . ,”
shows Congress intended to let the EPA, with its environmental
expertise, assess the sufficiency of the technical standards
necessary to maintain state authorization. Id.
However, the EPA‟s discretion ends with this first clause.
The remaining language in subsection (e) switches gears,
directing the Administrator to take specific action. As noted
above, use of the word shall leaves little room for debate. See
supra, Part I.C. Indeed, “[t]he word „shall‟ is ordinarily [t]he
language of command.” Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482, 485
(1947). Because RCRA “uses both „may‟ and „shall‟, the normal
inference is that each is used in its usual sense - the one act being
permissive, the other mandatory.” Id. The agency does have
discretion, but that discretion is limited to determining whether a
state continues to meet authorization requirements. Once the
EPA makes that determination, the discretion ends, and
Congress mandates that authorization be withdrawn.
Fortunately, this argument does not rest on parsing
statutory language alone, but also on sound jurisprudence. In
National Wildlife Federation v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit held that
the Safe Drinking Water Act gave the EPA no discretion to refuse
withdrawing state authorization under that act.1 980 F.2d 765,
1. The circuit court‟s description of the SDWA in National Wildlife
Federation demonstrates the applicability of D.C. Court‟s analysis to the RCRA
analysis before this Court. Under the SDWA, the EPA established safe water
drinking standards, granted states primacy to implement their own programs,
and then monitored compliance. 980 F.2d at 768. If a state no longer met the
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767-68 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
Although the EPA amended its
withdrawal regulation to state, “the Administrator may initiate
proceedings to withdraw program approval,” and its preamble “to
make clear that the Agency‟s decision to initiate withdrawal . . . is
discretionary,” these revisions did not overrule the statutory
requirement that non-compliance triggered withdrawal. Id. at
769, 772. Giving the EPA discretion to determine whether a state
program met approval and whether to withdraw approval if it did
not, would strip the statute of its plain meaning and “would
require nothing from the agency.” Id. at 772. This power grab is
precisely what the EPA is trying to do once again by refusing to
initiate withdrawal proceedings against New Union. Under the
EPA‟s interpretation of the statute, the agency wields unlimited
power in the state-authorization field with no Congressional
oversight. Congress did not intend nor codify such a delegation of
power.
C. Chaney’s presumption is inapplicable because the
Court must interpret a statutory provision and
Congress provided ‘law to apply.’
This argument does not run counter to the policy
considerations and principles announced in Heckler v. Chaney,
limiting judicial review of agency non-enforcement decisions. 470
U.S. 821 (1985). First, while the policy considerations established
in Chaney may weigh against judicially mandating New Union‟s
withdrawal, the issue at hand primarily focuses on EPA‟s
statutory duties and the interpretation of RCRA‟s withdrawal
provision. As National Wildlife Federation pointed out, even in
the context of a non-enforcement decision, “when a legal
challenge focuses on an announcement of a substantive statutory
interpretation, courts are emphatically qualified to decide
whether an agency has acted outside the bounds of reason . . . .”
980 F.2d at 773 (quoting Int’l Union United Auto., Aerospace, &
Agric. Implement Workers v. Brock, 783 F.2d 237, 245-46 (D.C.
Cir. 1986)). Here, the agency has done just that.
primacy criteria, the Administrator was to notify the state of its decision and, if
not corrected, § 1413(b) of the SDWA required the Administrator to withdraw
primacy. Id. The similarities in the analyses are obvious.
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Most critically, Chaney‟s presumption does not apply because
RCRA provides „law to apply‟ that limits the EPA‟s discretion. “If
[Congress] has indicated an intent to circumscribe agency
enforcement discretion, and has provided meaningful standards
for defining the limits of that discretion, there is „law to apply‟ . . .
and courts may require the agency to follow that
law . . . .”
Chaney, 470 U.S. at 834-35. Section 3006(e)‟s use of mandatory
language unmistakably shows where the EPA‟s discretion ends
and its duty begins. Once it determines a state program no
longer meets authorization requirements, the EPA must
withdraw authorization. Congress‟s intent could not be any
clearer. Therefore, Chaney‟s presumption does not apply.
VI. THE EPA MUST WITHDRAW AUTHORIZATION
OF NEW UNION’S PROGRAM BECAUSE THE
ERAA AMENDMENT TO THE RRA IS
INCONSISTENT UNDER THE HAZARDOUS
MATERIAL TRANSPORTATION ACT AND RCRA.
In 1975, Congress passed the Hazardous Materials
Transportation Act (“HMTA”) to regulate the transport of
hazardous waste in intrastate, interstate, and foreign commerce.
49 U.S.C. § 5101 (2006). The EPA adopted the Department of
Transportation‟s hazardous material regulations implementing
the HMTA in order to satisfy their obligation under § 3003 of
RCRA to govern the transport of hazardous waste. 42 U.S.C. §
6923 (2006). The ERAA‟s amendment to the RRA renders the law
inconsistent with the HMTA, and the federal statute therefore
preempts the state law. As such, New Union‟s program is
inconsistent with the federal RCRA program, and the EPA should
withdraw its authorization.
A. The ERAA is preempted by the HMTA because the
statute is inconsistent under the second prong of
the HMTA’s preemption analysis.
In Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Public Service
Commission of Nevada, the Ninth Circuit considered a
preemption challenge to regulations of the Nevada Public Service
Commission vesting the Commission with, among other things,
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permitting authority over the loading, unloading, transfer, and
storage of hazardous material on railroad property. 909 F.2d 352,
354 (9th Cir. 1990). The court began its analysis by explaining
that the HMTA‟s goal was to create a national, uniform scheme of
hazardous material transportation to “replace a patchwork of
state and federal laws and regulations . . . .” Id. at 353. To meet
this goal, the HMTA expressly preempted state or local
regulations inconsistent with the statute. Id. at 355. The statute
defined “inconsistent” as situations where (1) compliance with the
local regulations and the HMTA were impossible or (2) the local
regulations were an obstacle to the accomplishment or execution
of the HMTA. Id. According to the Ninth Circuit, the Nevada
regulations fit this definition because they “create[d] a separate
regulatory regime for these activities, fostering confusion and
frustrating Congress‟ goal of developing a uniform, national
scheme of regulation.” Id. at 358. The court also expressed
concern over the Commission‟s presumed ability to arbitrarily
approve or deny permits irrespective of federal regulations and
the potential expense and delay that would accompany such
discretion. Id. Therefore, the court found that the Nevada
regulations violated the second leg of the HMTA‟s inconsistency
analysis and were preempted by the federal statute. Id. at 359.
The amendment to the RRA raises the same concerns as the
preempted regulations in Southern Pacific and likewise fails the
second prong of the HMTA‟s inconsistency definition.
By
transferring permitting and inspection authority of railroad
hazardous waste facilities from the state program to the
Commission, New Union creates a duplicative burden on railroad
hazardous material transporters, subjecting them to two
regulatory regimes. As the D.C. Circuit pointed out, Congress
passed the HMTA in order to consolidate precisely this type of
regulation. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Ohio, 901
F.2d 497, 501 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The redundant burden of
following both the HMTA‟s and the Commission‟s regulations will
result in frustration, delay, and unnecessary expense for railroad
transporters of hazardous waste. New Union‟s amendment to the
RRA transferring this authority to the Commission is
inconsistent with the HMTA and is therefore preempted by §
5125(a) of the HMTA. 49 U.S.C. § 5125(a) (2006).
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B. The ERAA is inconsistent under RCRA because the
amendment fails to meet the EPA’s regulations.
Further, New Union‟s treatment of railroad hazardous waste
facilities renders the state‟s program inconsistent with the EPA‟s
own regulatory definitions that set RCRA‟s minimum standards.
Governing transporters of hazardous waste, § 271.11 mandates
that a state program must cover all transporters listed in § 263,
including rail. 40 C.F.R. § 271.11 (2010). The ERAA removed
rail transporters from the oversight of the DEP (and thus New
Union‟s hazardous waste program) and transferred that authority
to the Commission. Therefore, New Union‟s program no longer
sets standards for that class of transporters, directly
contravening § 271.11. Next, the ERAA fails § 271.13 because
state law and the DEP no longer govern permitting under the
RRA, again vesting that authority in the Commission. State law,
not a state agency, “must require permits for owners and
operators of all hazardous waste management facilities . . . .” 40
C.F.R. § 271.13 (emphasis added). Shifting permitting authority
to the Commission eliminates the political accountability
inherent in a state law-permitting regime - a crucial
consideration in environmental policy.
Finally and most
blatantly, New Union‟s RCRA program lacks the requisite
enforcement authority under § 271.16.
That section
unequivocally states that any approved program must have
criminal remedies available for violations of permit requirements.
40 C.F.R. § 271.16(a)(3) (2010).
Yet the ERAA explicitly
eliminated all criminal liability for facilities under the
Commission violating environmental statutes (presumably state
or federal). Once again, the ERAA puts New Union‟s hazardous
waste program on unequal ground with the federal RCRA
program.
According to Congress, a state program may differ from the
federal model in that states may adopt more stringent
requirements than those promulgated by the EPA. However,
New Union‟s treatment of railroad hazardous waste facilities does
precisely the opposite, completely removing them from the state‟s
RCRA program.
New Union‟s state program is plainly
inconsistent with the federal RCRA program and must be
withdrawn.
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VII. NEW UNION’S TREATMENT OF POLLUTANT X IS
PREEMPTED BY THE HMTA, FAILS RCRA’S
CONSISTENCY DEFINITION, AND VIOLATES
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE; THEREFORE, THE
EPA MUST WITHDRAW ITS AUTHORIZATION OF
NEW UNION’S PROGRAM.
A. New Union’s amendment to the ERAA regarding
Pollutant X is preempted by the HMTA.
Like the amendment to the RRA, the HMTA preempts New
Union‟s amendment to the HRA prohibiting transporters of
Pollutant X from stopping within the state. Complying with this
provision of the HRA presents obstacles to accomplishing the
purpose of the HMTA - safety through uniform regulation of
hazardous material transportation. For example, since one may
only stop in New Union for emergencies or refueling, a
transporter would have to construct routes around New Union in
order to accommodate for meals, lodging, or periodic breaks. This
rerouting could lead to longer routes and more time spent in
transit.
As the Federal Railroad Administration pointed out, “the risk
of releases of hazardous materials is reduced by minimizing the
time such shipments spend in transportation. It would be poor
policy to allow local governments to attempt to lower their risk by
raising everyone’s risk and by clogging the transportation
system.” Track Safety Standards, 63 Fed. Reg. 33,992, 33,999
(June 22, 1998) (emphasis added). In the context of the rail
system, § 172.822 specifically prohibits a state law that limits use
of a rail line for transporting hazardous materials. 49 C.F.R. §
172.822 (2010). In fact, the regulation warns that any such law is
preempted. Id. It is clear that both the RRA and HRA
amendments significantly infringe on the HMTA‟s ability to
establish uniform regulations for hazardous waste transportation
and are statutorily inconsistent under 49 U.S.C. § 5125(a). The
HMTA preempts the amendments and renders New Union‟s
program inconsistent with the federal RCRA program.
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B. New Union’s treatment of Pollutant X is
inconsistent with RCRA.
New Union‟s amendment concerning Pollutant X is
inconsistent with § 271.4‟s regulatory definition of consistency,
particularly subpart (a). Initially, it is worth noting that the
EPA‟s consistency requirement could be interpreted as simply
another characterization of RCRA‟s command that a state
program be at least as stringent as, or equivalent to, the federal
program. Rodgers, supra, at § 7:22. As discussed above, New
Union‟s program falls well below these standards.
More
specifically, the provision of the HRA amendment prohibiting
TSD permits for Pollutant X directly violates § 271.4(a)‟s rule
that no aspect of a state program may unreasonably restrict or
impede the free movement of hazardous waste across the state
border from or to other states. 40 C.F.R. § 271.4(a) (2010). This
is precisely what New Union has done. On its face, the statute
demonstrates New Union‟s goal to put all Pollutant X
responsibilities on “facilit[ies] located outside of the state,”
regardless of a party‟s potential willingness to construct a facility
in the state capable of Pollutant X treatment, disposal, or storage.
(Order at 12). As the Supreme Court and other circuits have
made clear, a state may not hoard its natural resources and place
the burden of conserving the state‟s natural resources on out-ofstate parties. City of Phila. v. N.J., 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978),
Envtl. Tech. Council v. Sierra Club, 98 F.3d 774, 786 (4th Cir.
1996).
Additionally, the HRA amendment provision restricting
transportation of Pollutant X through New Union likewise
violates subsection (a)‟s rule. Although New Union tries to
conceal its intent behind permissive language (“[a]ny person may.
. .”), the prohibitive effect of the provision is clear. (Order at 12).
As explained above in the preemption context, this provision will
require some transporters to avoid New Union because drivers
invariably must stop for meals, lodging, and breaks. However,
under New Union‟s amendment, these reasons are impermissible.
The New Union law operates as a restriction, impediment, and
ban on the free movement of hazardous waste across its border,
thus violating § 271.4(a).
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C. New Union’s treatment of Pollutant X violates the
Commerce Clause.
The ERAA amendment prohibiting the importation or
treatment of Pollutant X is unquestionably subject to Commerce
Clause scrutiny. “It is well settled that actions are within the
domain of the Commerce Clause if they burden interstate
commerce or impede its free flow.” NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 31 (1937) (emphasis added), see C & A
Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 391 (1994)
(“[T]he article of commerce is not so much the solid waste itself,
but rather the service of processing and disposing of it.”). A more
difficult question asks which well-established Commerce Clause
analysis applies to the ERAA. Because the statute, in substance,
discriminates against interstate commerce, it is subject to strict
scrutiny. The statute fails this level of constitutional scrutiny.
The cleverly crafted ERAA amendment presents the precise
opposite - though no less unconstitutional - discrimination
invalidated in C & A Carbone and similar cases. In Carbone, the
Supreme Court established that the Commerce Clause “presumes
a national market free from local legislation that discriminates in
favor of local interests.” Id. at 393. Against this backdrop, the
Court measured the town of Clarkstown‟s ordinance commanding
local waste be deposited at a specific local facility. Id. at 386.
Facing the same dilemma before this Court, Justice Kennedy
explained that “[t]he real question” was whether the ordinance
per se violated the Commerce Clause under City of Philadelphia,
or whether the more lenient balancing test was appropriate
under Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). C &
A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 389.
Finding the ordinance per se unconstitutional, the Court
looked past the ordinance‟s explicit terms and focused on the
“practical effect and design” instead. Id. at 394. The practical
effect was plain - the ordinance barred importing a service and
deprived competitors of access to local markets. Id. at 386, 392.
Further, the ordinance was “no less discriminatory because instate or in-town processors are also covered by the prohibition.”
Id. at 391. The Court‟s message was clear - the Commerce Clause
invalidates local laws completely prohibiting interstate
commerce. Id. at 390.
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Just as the Supreme Court did in Carbone, this Court must
examine the ERAA‟s “overall effect on local and interstate
commerce.” Waste Sys. Corp. v. Cnty. of Marion, 985 F.2d 1381,
1386 (8th Cir. 1993). Unlike the ordinance in Carbone, the ERAA
states that all Pollutant X must be treated, stored, or disposed of
somewhere - indeed, anywhere - other than New Union. Besides
breaching the common-sense prohibition that a state “may not
attach restrictions to exports or imports in order to control
commerce in other [s]tates,” C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 393, the
ERAA violates the Commerce Clause in a much more
fundamental way. Our Nation is one economic unit. Cnty. of
Marion, 985 F.2d at 1388. As such, “one state may not „isolate
itself from a problem common to many by erecting a barrier
against the movement of interstate trade.‟” Gov’t Suppliers
Consolidating Servs., Inc. v. Bayh, 975 F.2d 1267, 1277 (7th Cir.
1992) (quoting City of Phila., 437 U.S. at 628).
This is precisely what New Union has done.
Understandably, the state is concerned with the well-being of its
citizens. But the courts have squarely rejected health, safety, and
environmental justifications as sufficient to uphold a complete
restriction on interstate commerce. Cnty. of Marion, 985 F.2d at
1388-89. The Pollutant X problem is not unique to New Union; it
is shared by all. Only with coordinated interstate cooperation
will the solution to this threat be achieved. Where the ordinances
in C & A Carbone and County of Marion completely forbade the
transport of waste out of those areas, New Union may no more
permissibly block the transport of waste into the state. As City of
Philadelphia bluntly stated, “the clearest example of such
[impermissible] legislation is a law that overtly blocks the flow of
interstate commerce at a State‟s borders. 437 U.S. at 624.
Because interstate commerce flows out of and into a state, the
ERAA amendment is a per se violation of the Commerce Clause.
CONCLUSION
CARE petitioned the EPA to withdraw approval of New
Union‟s hazardous waste program that was blatantly in violation
of the EPA‟s approved state program. New Union‟s program
should not continue to operate because the district court erred in
denying CARE jurisdiction under RCRA § 7002(A)(2) and 28
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U.S.C. § 1331. The EPA‟s failure to act on CARE‟s petition was a
grant of authorization for New Union‟s program, reviewable
under RCRA § 7006(b)(2).
The deficiencies in New Union‟s program are so egregious
that the EPA must withdraw its approval because Congress has
limited the agency‟s discretion, the ERAA amendments are
inconsistent and preempted by the HMTA, and New Union‟s
treatment of Pollutant X violates the Commerce Clause. For the
foregoing reasons, CARE respectfully requests that this Court
REVERSE the decision of the district court denying CARE‟s
claims for lack of jurisdiction, lift the stay, and review the EPA‟s
grant of authorization for New Union‟s program.
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